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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, roughly 870,000 prison inmates nationwide work full-time,1
out of a total prison population of 1.6 million.2 Most of these are engaged
in “prison housework,”3 such as food service, laundry, and maintenance.4
But between 75 and 80,000 work in prison industries, producing goods
and performing services, primarily for government agencies, but also in
some cases for the private sector.5 While only involving a relatively small
*
Associate Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law, Greensboro, North
Carolina. Thanks to Daniel Karlsson (Elon Law Class of 2015) and Kayla Mohr (Elon Law
Class of 2016) for their valued research assistance. Thanks also to the participants and
attendees at the 2016 Idaho Law Review Symposium for their insightful questions and
comments. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercialShareAlike
4.0
International
License
(CC
BY-NC-SA
4.0)
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/.
1. Beth Schwartzapfel, Modern-Day Slavery in America’s Prison Workforce,
AMERICAN PROSPECT (May 28, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/great-american-chain-gang;
Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic
Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 868 (2008).
2. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014, at 2 (Dec. 2015)
(revised on Jan. 21, 2016). Local jails hold an additional 0.74 million, many of whom also work
while incarcerated. Id.; Zatz, supra note 1, at 868.
3. Zatz, supra note 1, at 870 n.43 (“Approximately 550,000 inmates perform this
type of work.”).
4. Zatz, supra note 1, at 870.
5. Zatz, supra note 1, at 869. For an in-depth profile of one such program, see
Michael J. Berens & Mike Baker, Sell Block: Broken Prison Labor Program Fails to Keep
Promises,
Costs
Millions,
THE
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Dec.
13,
2014),
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fraction of the inmate workforce, these programs have been “the highestprofile and most controversial form of prison labor.”6
In one recent high-profile example, the Whole Foods grocery chain
came under fire for selling organic goat cheese and other items produced
by businesses using prison labor (paid well below minimum wage7) under

http://projects.seattletimes.com/2014/prison-labor/1/ (reporting on Washington Correctional
Industries, “the nation’s fourth-largest prison labor program”).
6. Zatz, supra note 1, at 869. For a sampling of the abundant coverage and criticism
of these programs in the popular media, see Tim Smith, Outcry Leads to Changes With Pay for
Prison
Labor,
GREENVILLE
NEWS
(Sept.
25,
2015),
http://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/news/2015/09/25/prison-system-make-changeprisoner-pay/72728592/; Liz Fields, Hard Labor: Here’s the Weird Shit Inmates Can Do for
Work in US Prisons, VICE (Sept. 9, 2015), https://news.vice.com/article/hard-labor-heres-theweird-shit-inmates-can-do-for-work-in-us-prisons; Graeme Wood, From Our Prison to Your
Dinner Table, PACIFIC STANDARD (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.psmag.com/businesseconomics/from-our-prison-to-your-dinner-table; Rebecca McCray, A Disturbing Trend in
Agriculture:
Prisoner-Picked
Vegetables,
TAKEPART
(Apr.
14,
2014),
http://www.takepart.com/article/2014/04/14/prison-ag-labor; Vicky Pelaez, The Prison
Industry in the United States: Big Business or a New Form of Slavery, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Mar.
31,
2014),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-the-united-states-bigbusiness-or-a-new-form-of-slavery/8289; Chris Gentilviso, Military Turns to Prison Labor for
$100 Million in Uniforms—At $2-Per-Hour Wages, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 24, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/24/military-prison-uniforms_n_4498867.html;
M.
Alex Johnson & Bill Lambdin, Inside the Secret Industry of Inmate-Staffed Call Centers,
MSNBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/01/12/10140493inside-the-secret-industry-of-inmate-staffed-call-centers; Mike Elk & Bob Sloan, The Hidden
History
of
ALEC
&
Prison
Labor,
THE
NATION
(Aug.
1,
2011),
http://www.thenation.com/article/hidden-history-alec-and-prison-labor/; Rania Khalek, 21stCentury Slaves: How Corporations Exploit Prison Labor, ALTERNET (July 21, 2011),
http://www.alternet.org/story/151732/21stcentury_slaves%3A_how_corporations_exploit_prison_labor; Michelle Chen, State Budget
Battles Converge on Prison Labor Force, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelle-chen/prison-labor_b_835014.html;
Abe
Louise
Young, BP Hires Prison Labor to Clean Up Spill While Coastal Residents Struggle, THE
NATION (July 21, 2010), http://www.thenation.com/article/bp-hires-prison-labor-clean-spillwhile-coastal-residents-struggle/; Bob Sloan, The Prison Industries Enhancement Certification
Program: Why Everyone Should Be Concerned, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (March 15, 2010),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2010/mar/15/the-prison-industries-enhancementcertification-program-why-everyone-should-be-concerned/.
Organized labor has been among the strongest critics of these programs. See James
Kilgore, Mass Incarceration & Working Class Interests: Which Side Are the Unions On?, 37
LABOR STUDIES JOURNAL 356, 363 (2013). “The AFL-CIO opposes the widespread use of prison
labor throughout the public and private sectors in the United States in unfair competition with
free labor.” AFL-CIO EXEC. COMM., STATEMENT ON THE EXPLOITATION OF PRISON LABOR (May
7, 1997). Kilgore argues that “organized labor’s choice to prioritize this issue is an escape from
the far more vexing process of the criminalization of the working class as embodied in mass
incarceration.” Kilgore at 364. I share Kilgore’s view that “the major labor-related problem
[associated with mass incarceration] is the deprivation of liberty endured by the more than
two million who are behind bars and the restricted labor market opportunities of the nearly
five million people on parole and probation.” Id. The two prison industry programs on which I
focus represent only a small, and not necessarily the most troubling, part of this problem. But
I believe they represent a strategically advantageous target for legal reform, for the reasons I
indicate below.
7. Jennifer Alsever, Prison Labor’s New Frontier: Artisanal Foods, FORTUNE (June
2, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/06/02/prison-labor-artisanal/ (“Base pay starts at 60¢ a day,
but most prisoners earn $300 to $400 a month with incentives.”). It is unclear how many hours
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contract with Colorado Corrections Industries (“CCI”).8 In response to the
controversy, Whole Foods announced that it would cease to carry these
products by April 2016.9
At the heart of the controversy is the fact that incarcerated workers10
enjoy few of the legal rights and protections that apply to non-prison
employment. For the most part, courts have sought to resolve this conflict
by denying legal recognition of the hybrid status and role-set of
incarcerated workers. Instead, they have generally insisted on a strict
dichotomy between two mutually incompatible statuses—inmate and
employee—reducing incarcerated workers to the former status and
limiting their legal rights accordingly.11 This approach may be expedient
for courts, worried about a potential flood of labor and employment claims
by incarcerated workers, and for prison administrators, concerned with
potential threats to order and their own power within the “total
institutions” they oversee.12 But its consequence, for incarcerated workers
and for workers in general, is deeply troubling.13
Critics have challenged the disparate treatment of incarcerated
workers as both unfounded and unjust, and argued for their protection
under generally applicable employment laws.14 Sharing these concerns, I
argue that incarcerated workers, like others performing similar labor,
should have the legally-protected right to organize, bargain collectively,
inmates work per day under this program. For a 35-hour workweek, $400/month would equate
to an hourly wage of just $2.85.
8. Alsever, supra note 7; Rebecca J. Rose, How Dairy Milked by Prisoners Ends Up
on
Whole
Foods
Shelves,
THE
ATLANTIC
(June
18,
2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/06/how-dairy-milked-prisoners-ends-upon-whole-foods-shelves/372937/.
9. Candice Choi, Whole Foods to Stop Selling Products Made by Colorado Inmates,
THE DENVER POST (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_28900179/wholefoods-stop-selling-products-made-by-colorado.
10. I use the term “incarcerated worker” to identify the status of prisoners within a
prison-labor system. The status of incarcerated worker comprises the role-set of “prisoner” and
“worker”—nominally distinct social roles, playing out in different social relationships, carrying
different behavioral expectations. See Robert K. Merton, The Role-Set: Problems in
Sociological Theory, 8 BRITISH J. SOCIOLOGY 106, 110–12 (1957). The intersection of these roles
gives rise to “conflicting role-expectations.” See id. at 112.
11.
See Zatz, supra note 1, at 882, n.101–03 (collecting cases).
12.
See Erving Goffman, On the Characteristics of Total Institutions: Staff-Inmate
Relations, IN THE PRISON: STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE (Donald
Cressey ed. 1961).
13.
See infra, part II.C.
14. See, e.g., Patrice A. Fulcher, Emancipate the FLSA: Transform the Harsh
Economic Reality of Working Inmates, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 679, 680 (2015) (arguing
that minimum wage and overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act “should categorically
apply to all inmate laborers”); Josh Kovensky, It’s Time to Pay Prisoners the Minimum Wage:
Paying Just $2 a Day Hurts Our Economy and Punishes Families, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug.
15,
2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/119083/prison-labor-equal-rights-wagesincarcerated-help-economy; Beth Schwartzapfel, Modern-Day Slavery in America’s Prison
Workforce, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (May 2014), http://prospect.org/article/great-americanchain-gang; Jackson Taylor Kirkloin, Title VII Protections for Inmates: A Model Approach for
Safeguarding Civil Rights in America’s Prisons, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1088 (2011)
(“[I]nmates should not be excluded from the antidiscrimination protections of Title VII”).
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and engage in other concerted activity aimed at improving their terms
and conditions of employment.15 Doing so would empower incarcerated
workers to advance their own interests as workers, while also helping to
mitigate the unfair competition that prison labor represents for nonincarcerated workers.
While I would argue for extending these rights to all inmate labor, I
focus here on two programs: the Prison Industries Enhancement
Certification Program (“PIE”) and Federal Prison Industries (a.k.a.
UNICOR). These programs are advantageous targets for legal reform
because they are governed by federal law.16 I argue that the NLRB17 (in
the case of inmate contract labor under PIE) and the FLRA18 (in the case
of federal inmates working for UNICOR) should recognize incarcerated
workers as statutory employees with representational and bargaining
rights under existing law. Alternatively, the federal statutes and
regulations governing UNICOR and PIE should be amended to extend
such rights to inmates working under those programs.
The relatively small scope of inmate labor under UNICOR and PIE
has a further practical advantage. Starting with these two programs as a
pilot, it would be possible to experiment with different models of union
representation and bargaining, tailored to the distinctive circumstances
of prison labor. To the extent that resistance to inmate unionization is
driven by concerns about the potential adverse impact on prison
operations, such a pilot would provide an opportunity for evidence-based
assessment, rather than ungrounded fear.
In part 2, I briefly review the history of inmate labor in the United
States, and provide an overview of PIE and UNICOR. In part 3, I argue
that incarcerated workers working under PIE and UNICOR should be
recognized as statutory employees under existing federal labor relations
law.

15. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2015) (declaring rights of employees under National Labor
Relations Act).
16. In contrast, most state prison inmate-workers would be regarded as state
employees (assuming they were legally recognized as employees at all), and their rights to
union representation and collective bargaining would be subject to state law. Consequently,
any effort to establish those rights would have to be fought on a state-by-state basis. See In re
Prisoners Labor Union at Marquette, Case No. R72, E163 (Mich. Empl. Rel. Comm., March
22, 1974) (holding inmates working under state Correctional Industries Act are not employees
under state public employee collective bargaining statute); Prisoners’ Labor Union at Green
Haven Prisoners’ Labor Union at Green Haven, 6 PERB ¶ 3033 (NY PERB 1973) (same), aff’d
sub nom. Prisoners’ Labor Union at Bedford Hills (Women’s Division) v. Helsby, 354 N.Y.S.2d
694 (NY App. Div. 1974); Florida Stat. Ann. § 447.203(3)(f) (excluding state inmates from
definition of employee under public employee collective bargaining statute); see also Rhode
Island Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State of Rhode Island, 7145 A.2d 584 (R.I. 1998)
(holding labor arbitrator exceeded her authority by classifying inmates as state employees
under state employee collective bargaining agreement).
17. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2015) (governing union representation and
collective bargaining in the private sector).
18. Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq.
(2015) (governing union organizing and collective bargaining for employees of federal executive
branch agencies).
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II. INMATE LABOR IN STATE PRISONS
A. History: Colonial Times to the 1970s
Convict labor has existed, in some form or other, since ancient
times.19 The standard account of its history in the United States traces
the adoption of various systems from the early Republic through to the
late nineteenth century.20 In the 1790s, inmates at Philadelphia’s Walnut
Street Jail, the “nation’s first true penitentiary,” produced goods under a
“piece price”21 system. The prison itself “supervised the production
process,” with “private contractors typically suppl[ying] raw materials
and purchas[ing] the finished product, which they resold on the open
market.”22 Similarly, under the “public account”23 or “state account”24
system, adopted at New York’s Auburn Prison and Pennsylvania’s
Eastern State Penitentiary in the early 1800s,25 “the state maintains
control over the production process, and prison-made goods are sold on
the open market.”26 During the mid-nineteenth century, the “contract”27
system emerged as “the dominant organizational form of prison labor
throughout the North.”28 The state’s role changed from direct producer to
labor broker, “sell[ing] the labor of its prisoners to private firms,” which
“oversee production, supply the required raw materials, and sell the
inmate-produced goods on the open market.”29 During the same period,

19. Henry Theodore Jackson, Prison Labor, 18 J. OF CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 218,
218–21 (1927) (tracing the history from ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome, through medieval
and early-modern Europe, to colonial America).
20. For this account, I draw primarily on Jackson, supra note 19, and Stephen P.
Garvey, Freeing Prisoners’ Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 345-74 (1998). See also, Whitney
Benns, “Free” Labor: Past & Present Forms of Prison Labor, ON LABOR (May 27, 2015),
http://onlabor.org/2015/05/27/free-labor-past-and-present-forms-of-prison-labor; Patrice A.
Fulcher, Emancipate the FLSA: Transform the Harsh Economic Reality of Working Inmates,
27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 679, 683–88 (2015); Jackson Taylor Kirklin, Title VII Protections
for Inmates: A Model Approach for Safeguarding Civil Rights in America’s Prisons, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1052–58 (2011); Zatz, supra note 1, at 869–71; Tracy F. Chang &
Douglas E. Thompkins, Corporations Go to Prisons: The Expansion of Corporate Power in the
Correctional Industry, 27 LABOR STUDIES J. 45, 54–55 (2002); Robert P. Weiss,
Humanitarianism, Labor Exploitation, or Social Control? A Critical Survey of Theory and
Research on the Origin and Development of Prisons, 12 SOCIAL HISTORY 331, 336-37, 344-50
(1987).
21. Jackson, supra note 19, at 229; Garvey, supra note 20, at 343.
22. Garvey, supra note 20, at 348-49; Jackson, supra note 19, at 229; Wash. Water
Jet Workers v. Yarbrough, 90 P.3d 42, 46 (Wash. 2004).
23. Jackson, supra note 19, at 225–26.
24. Garvey, supra note 20, at 343.
25. Garvey, supra note 20, at 350; Zatz, supra note 1, at 869–70.
26. Garvey, supra note 20, at 343, 349; Jackson, supra note 19, at 225; Yarbrough,
90 P.3d at 46.
27. Jackson, supra note 19, at 226–27; Garvey, supra note 20, at 343; Zatz, supra
note 1, at 870.
28. Garvey, supra note 20, at 352; Yarbrough, 90 P.3d at 40, 46.
29. Garvey, supra note 20, at 343, 352; Jackson, supra note 19, at 227.
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Southern states embraced the “lease”30 system. As with the contract
system, convict leasing placed inmates under the supervision of private
parties. But unlike the contract system, under which inmates remained
in the custody of the prison, convict leasing turned over all responsibility
for inmates to the private party.31
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the contract
and convict leasing systems faced growing criticism from reformers
concerned about abusive practices,32 and from business and labor groups
concerned about unfair competition.33 This opposition ultimately led to
the enactment of federal legislation—the Hawes-Cooper Act in 1929,34
followed by the Ashurst-Sumners Act in 193535—aimed at curbing the
practice by restricting the interstate sale of inmate-produced goods.36
With the general market no longer a viable outlet for inmateproduced goods, the “state use”37 system remained the only viable model
for prison industries. As under the “state account” system, the state itself
directly operates a prison industry.38 The primary distinction is that,
while prison industries under the state account system sold their output
on the open market, state and local government entities are the exclusive
market for goods and services under the state use system.39
B. Contemporary Inmate Labor
1. The Prison Industries Enhancement Certification Program
In 1979, Congress paved the way for a resurgence of prison contract
labor40 by authorizing an exemption under the Ashurst-Sumners Act for
certain “pilot projects designated by the Director of the Bureau of Justice

30.

Jackson, supra note 19, at 230; Garvey, supra note 20, at 345; Yarbrough, 90 P.3d

at 46.
31. Jackson, supra note 19, at 230; Garvey, supra note 20, at 345, 354–57.
32. Jackson, supra note 19, at 230–32; Garvey, supra note 20, at 363–64.
33. Jackson, supra note 19, at 228; Garvey, supra note 20, at 358–66; Fulcher, supra
note 20, at 686; Kirklin, supra note 20, 1054–55.
34. 49 U.S.C. § 11507 (2015) (prohibiting sale of inmate-produced goods by one state
to another).
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761–62 (2015) (criminalizing the knowing transportation of inmateproduced goods into a state that prohibits their sale). A 1940 amendment made the knowing
interstate transportation of inmate-produced goods a federal crime regardless of whether state
law prohibited the sale.
36. See Fulcher, supra note 20, at 688 (“The thought behind the [Hawes-Cooper Act]
was that it would help decrease the effect of the availability of cheap prison-made goods on the
open market.”); Garvey, supra note 20, at 366–67 (discussing adoption of Hawes-Cooper and
Ashurst-Sumner Acts).
37. Jackson, supra note 19, at 234; Garvey, supra note 20, at 367.
38. Jackson, supra note 19, at 234; Garvey, supra note 20, at 343, 367. Jackson’s
“public works and ways” system, under which inmates leave the prison to work on public
construction and road projects, is essentially a variant of the state use system. Jackson, supra
note 19, at 237–38.
39. Yarbrough, 90 P.3d at 47.
40. See Zatz, supra note 1, at 870 (noting that the contract system, which had “largely
disappeared by the early twentieth [century], . . . now seems to be reemerging”).
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Assistance.”41 Pursuant to this statutory authority, PIE permits certified
programs to produce goods for sale on the open market.42 They may do so
under an “employer” model, operating their own prison industries to
produce goods for sale on the open market, or a “customer” model,
contracting with private companies to employ inmates in their existing
operations.43
The statute imposes certain requirements for employment of
inmates under certified programs:
•  They must be paid at least the local prevailing wage for their
work,44 subject to deductions (capped at 80% of gross
wages)45 for taxes,46 cost of room and board,47 family
support,48 and victim compensation;49

41. Federal Justice System Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 96-157, § 827, 93 Stat.
1167 (1979), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c). See Fulcher, supra note 20, at 692; Zatz, supra
note 1, at 869 n.37; Chang & Thompkins, supra note 20, at 55.
Outside of PIE, states continue to operate prison industries, using inmate labor to
supply state and local government with a wide variety of goods and services. See, e.g., Gordon
Lafer,
Captive
Labor,
The
AMERICAN
PROSPECT
(Dec.
19,
2001),
http://prospect.org/article/captive-labor (citing Oregon inmates performing data entry, record
keeping, and other work for state agencies; Georgia inmates working for private recycling
company under contract with county waste management authority). In some states, inmates
also perform service work for the private sector, which is not subject to the restrictions on the
sale of prison-made goods under Hawes-Cooper and Ashurst-Sumner. See id. (citing California
inmates taking airline reservations; Oregon inmates washing laundry for private hospital);
Zatz, supra note 1, at 869 n.38 (citing PIE Guideline, 64 Fed. Reg. 17000, 17009 (Apr. 7, 1999)).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c) (2015).
43. PIE Guideline, 64 Fed. Reg. at 17008; Garvey, supra note 20, at 344; Fulcher,
supra note 20, at 692.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(2) (2015) (“wages at a rate which is not less than that paid for
work of similar nature in the locality in which the work is performed”). In contrast, state prison
inmates working in non-PIE settings are typically paid well below the federal minimum wage.
See Fulcher, supra note 20, at 682 n.7 (hourly pay rates of $0.93 to $4.73). In some cases, they
are paid nothing at all. Fulcher, supra note 20, at 694 (Georgia state prisons); Chang &
Thompkins, supra note, at 20 (Texas Correction Industry).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(2) (2015). In the 3rd quarter of 2015, deductions accounted
for 60% of total gross paid to inmates under PIE. National Correctional Industries Association,
PIECP Quarterly Report, Statistics for the Quarter Ending Sept. 30, 2015 (reporting total
gross wages of $11.02 million, with total deductions of $6.58 million). Of the amounts deducted,
the largest share (57.6%) went to inmate room and board ($3.79 million, 34.% of gross wages).
Victims programs ($1.19 million) and taxes ($1.20 million) each accounted for about 18% of
total deductions, and inmate family support ($0.39 million) accounted for just under 6% of total
deductions. Out of total net wages of $4.44 million, about $0.66 million (14.9% of net wages,
6% of gross) was set aside for mandatory savings.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(2)(A) (2015).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(2)(B) (2015).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(2)(C) (2015).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(2)(D) (2015). The statute requires that inmates contribute at
least 5% of gross pay for victim compensation, with a maximum of 20%. Id.
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•  They must be eligible for workers’ compensation and similar
government-provided benefits on the same terms as other
employees;50
•  Their participation must be voluntary.51
Despite the prevailing wage requirement, and even ignoring the
mandatory deductions,52 inmates working under PIE are actually paid
less than most workers performing similar work in the relevant locality.
First, the Bureau of Justice Assistance has interpreted the statutory
requirement to mean “that wages must be set at or above the tenth
percentile”53 for comparable work in the relevant locale. Even under this
“generous interpretation of comparable,”54 even forgiving interpretation,
some programs have paid wages below that threshold.55 Moreover, in
several jurisdictions, incarcerated workers receive even lower wages
during a “training period,” ranging from two months to over a year.56
In the most recently reported period, average gross monthly wages
for inmates working under PIE were about $754, with an average net
monthly pay of about $304.57

50. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(3) (2015). The statute specifically disqualifies participating
inmates from “receiv[ing] any payments for unemployment compensation while incarcerated”.
Id.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(4) (2015).
52. The compulsory nature of these deductions, and the fact that inmates must pay
the cost of their own incarceration out of their wages, are controversial. See, e.g., Fulcher, supra
note 20. Yet, as a purely financial matter, incarcerated workers under PIE are not necessarily
worse off than non-incarcerated workers in this regard. The wages of non-incarcerated workers
are likewise subject to legally-mandated withholding for income and payroll taxes, and
garnishment for court-ordered child and spousal support, and other debts. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673
(2015) (limiting amount of wage garnishments). Non-incarcerated workers must also pay for
food, housing, and other living expenses out of their wages (or savings). See Key Facts, The
State of the Nation’s Housing 2015, JOINT CENT. FOR HOUSING STUDIES (2015),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/son_2015_key_facts.pdf (“Over 80
percent of households with incomes under $15,000 (equivalent to full-time pay at the federal
minimum wage)” spend more than 30% of income on housing) .
53. BARBARA J. AUERBACH, SUMMARY FINDINGS OF THE 2009-2010 PIECP
COMPLIANCE SITE ASSESSMENTS, NAT’L CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES ASS’N 6 (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://www.nationalcia.org/wp-content/uploads/09-10-PIE-Assessment-Report.pdf. In other
words, inmates working under PIE may be paid less than 90% of non-incarcerated workers
performing the same jobs in the relevant locality.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 8.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Averages based on reported total quarterly wages and total inmate employment
for 3rd quarter 2015. NAT’L CORR. INDUST. ASS’N, PRISONER INDUSTRY CERTIFICATION & COST
ACCOUNTING CENTER LISTING, STATISTICS FOR THE QUARTER ENDING SEPT. 30, 2015 (2015),
http://www.nationalcia.org/wp-content/uploads/Second-Quarter-2015-Certification-ListingReport-1.pdf. Because the report does not indicate the number of hours worked, it is not
possible to calculate an average hourly wage for inmates under PIE. Assuming an average 35hour week, the reported gross wage figures work yield an average hourly wage on only $5.39.
Since this is less than the statutory minimum wage, it must be presumed that inmates
employed under PIE are working less than full-time on average.
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A total of 46 programs are currently certified under PIE, employing
roughly 5,000 incarcerated workers.58 PIE thus accounts for only a tiny
percentage of all inmate labor. Yet the program has drawn particular
attention, and been subject to particular criticism because of the
involvement of private for-profit businesses.59
2. Federal Prison Industries
For federal inmates, “a regular job assignment” is compulsory
(absent a medical excuse).60 As in state prisons, many inmates perform
prison housework, while others work in prison industries.61 In the federal
system, the latter operates under the auspices of Federal Prison
Industries, Inc. (“FPI”), a government-owned corporation established in
1934.62 FPI, also known as UNICOR, supplies federal government
agencies with an array of goods and services using inmate labor.63
UNICOR pays incarcerated workers between $0.23 and $1.15 an
hour.64 As under PIE, earnings are subject to mandatory deductions of up
to 50% of gross wages under the Inmate Financial Responsibility
Program.65
58. Id. (reporting 4870 inmates employed). The figure has fluctuated between about
4,700 and 5,500 inmates employed in recent years. See Kilgore, supra note 6, at 363 (4719
inmates as of 4th quarter 2011); Zatz, supra note 1, n.37 (5500 inmates as of 3rd quarter 2007).
59. See Alsever, supra note 7.
60. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE ADMISSION &
ORIENTATION
HANDBOOK
19
(2014),
https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/gre/GRE_fpc_aohandbook.pdf.
61. Id.
62. Pub. L. 73-461, 48 Stat. 1211 (1934); FED. PRISON INDUS., FISCAL YEAR 2015
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2015). Management of FPI is under the direction of the Director and
Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, who serve as Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Operating Officer respectively. Id.
63. FED. PRISON INDUS., INC., FISCAL YEAR 2015, ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT 1–
2 (2015) (identifying Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and Veterans
Affairs, and the General Services Administration, as “FPI’s largest federal government
customers”); UNICOR, FACTORIES WITH FENCES, 75 YEARS OF CHANGING LIVES (2009),
https://www.unicor.gov/publications/corporate/CATMC1101_C.pdf. In 2012, Congress
authorized FPI to serve the commercial market under limited circumstances. Consolidated
and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-55; FED. PRISON INDUS., INC.,
FISCAL YEAR 2015, ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT 2 (2015). The same legislation also made
FPI eligible to participate in PIE, and inmates currently work for PIE operations at two federal
prisons. FED. PRISON INDUS., INC., FISCAL YEAR 2015, ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT 6–7
(2015).
64. UNICOR,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://www.unicor.gov/FAQ_General.aspx (last visited Apr. 28, 2016); FED. PRISON INDUS.,
INC., FISCAL YEAR 2015, ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT 12 (Nov. 16, 2015)
See
Fulcher,
http://www.unicor.gov/publications/corporate/FY2015_AnnualReport.pdf;
supra note 20, at 682 n.7. A 1993 report, prepared at the request of Senator Harry Reid,
assessed the financial and other impact of applying the federal minimum wage to prison
labor. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Honroable Harry Reid, U.S. Senate,
Prisoner Labor: Perspectives on Paying the Federal Minimum Wage, GAO.GOV (May 1993)
http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/217999.pdf.
65. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE ADMISSION &
ORIENTATION
HANDBOOK
19
(March
2014),
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UNICOR employs roughly 13,000 inmates (7% of the eligible federal
prison population).66 This represents less than 3% of all prison labor
nationwide.
C. Exploitation of Inmate Labor
Concerns about exploitation are at the heart of the controversy over
prison labor.67 The harm falls directly on incarcerated workers
themselves, who serve as “cheap, in many instances free, labor” for a
“Prison Industrial Complex” that is “fueled by the economic interests of
federal and state correctional institutions, private corporations, and
politicians.”68 The harm also falls indirectly on non-incarcerated workers,
as competition from prison labor “threatens the wages, benefits and
working conditions and jobs of free labor.”69
Exploitation has both a descriptive and a normative sense.
Descriptively, “the term simply means to make use of” something.70 As
applied to social relationships and exchanges, exploitation generally
connotes an element of unfairness rooted in power asymmetry.71 Power
asymmetry both explains how one party is able to make advantageous
use of another, and characterizes the situation as unfair.72 This sense of
exploitation as a normative critique is commonly applied to labor
practices involving unusually low wages or harsh conditions.73 In this
sense, to describe prison labor as exploitive is to argue that the practice
is unfair, because incarcerated workers lack any bargaining power,

https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/gre/GRE_fpc_aohandbook.pdf (citing 18 U.S.C. §
3013) (deductions for “court ordered restitution, fines and court costs, judgments in favor of
the U.S., other debts owed the Federal government, and other court-ordered obligations (e.g.
child support, alimony, other judgments)”).
66. UNICOR,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://www.unicor.gov/FAQ_General.aspx (last visited Apr. 28, 2016) (citing FY 2013 figures).
The figures were higher as recently as 2009. See FED. PRISON INDUS., INC., FISCAL YEAR 2009,
ANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORT 12 (2009) (20,000 inmates, 16% of population); James Kilgore,
Mass Incarceration & Working Class Interests: Which Side Are the Unions On?, 37 LABOR
STUDIES J. 356, 363–64 (2013).
67. See Whitney Benns, American Slavery, Reinvented, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 21,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-in-america/406177/
(“[W]hile some form of work for the incarcerated may be important, the current form is
troubling. These workers are vulnerable to the kind of workplace exploitation that American
has otherwise deemed inhumane.”).
68. Fulcher, supra note 20, at 682.
69. UE Convention, Curb the Prison-Industrial Complex (2000).
70. DAVID STRECKER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POWER 232 (Keith Dowding ed.) (2011).
71. Id.; see also John Lawrence Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 631, 679, 683–
84 (1994) (identifying “the taking advantage of some vulnerability” as the essence of
exploitation).
72. Strecker, supra note 66.
73. See, e.g., Robert Mayer, Sweatshops, Exploitation, and Moral Responsibility, 38
J. OF SOC’Y PHILOSOPHY 605 (2007); Robert Mayer, Guestworkers and Exploitation, 67 REV. OF
POLITICS 311 (2005); Chris Meyers, Wrongful Beneficence: Exploitation and Third World
Sweatshops, 35 J. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 319 (2004).
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whether in the form of exit or voice,74 and are simply compelled to work
under whatever terms and conditions the prison system imposes.
Indeed, some critics have identified prison labor, particularly when
employed by private for-profit business, as a form of “superexploitation.”75
The concept of superexploitation derives from the more general Marxist
theory of exploitation,76 describing a qualitative change in the
relationship between labor-power and surplus-value appropriation.77 But
74. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). In Hirschman’s theory, “exit” and “voice” are the
two primary ways of expressing dissatisfaction with organizational performance. Id. at 3–4.
Applying these concepts to the labor relationship, the “exit” option exists when workers are
able to quit, either to seek work elsewhere, or to abstain from employment altogether; the
“voice” option exists when workers have a meaningful channel for expressing grievances. Id.
at 30 (defining “voice” as “an attempt at changing the practice, politics, and outputs of … the
organization to which one belongs”). By definition, inmates subject to mandatory work policies
have no exit option. And the voice option remains hollow when prison administrators have
neither an obligation nor an incentive to listen. Indeed, the situation for incarcerated workers
is akin to that which Hirschman associates with “criminal gangs,” whose leaders regard “voice
as mutiny” to be “severely penalized”. Id. at 121.
75. See, e.g., Kilgore, supra note 6, at 357; MARC BOSQUET, WE WORK, IN JEFFREY
WILLIAMS, THE CRITICAL PULSE: THIRTY-SIX CREDOS BY CONTEMPORARY CRITICS 64 (2012);
Lawrence Albright, Prison Proletariat: Exploiting Inmate Labor, POLITICAL AFFAIRS (June
2007) http://politicalaffairs.net/prison-proletariat-exploiting-inmate-labor; Avery Gordon,
Globalism and the Prison Industrial Complex: An Interview with Angela Davis, in AVERY
GORDON, KEEPING GOOD TIME: REFLECTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND PEOPLE 49 (2004);
76. In Marxist theory, exploitation refers to the capitalist appropriation of surplusvalue through the labor-process. G. A. Cohen, The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of
Exploitation, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 338, 339–41 (1979). In that process, workers produce
commodities, the value of which exceeds their wages (determined by “the value of labourpower”). The difference, which Marx calls surplus-value, is the source of the capitalist’s profit.
KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 1, 45–46 (Modern Library Ed.
1906) (defining “the value of a commodity” as a function of “the working-time necessary, under
given social conditions, for its production”); 190 (defining the value of labor-power as “the value
of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of the labourer”), 207–220
(explaining the creation and appropriation of surplus-value through the labor-process); G. A.
Cohen, The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS
338, 339–41 (1979). While “the Marixian concept of exploitation” may be understood as “a
purely scientific one, with no moral content,” it implies a normative critique of capitalist labor
relations as unjust. Id. at 341–42; John Roemer, Should Marxists Be Interested in
Exploitation? 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 30, 36–38 (1985) (distinguishing positive and normative
claims in Marxist theory of exploitation); Strecker, supra note 70, at 233–34 (suggesting that
the Marxist theory of exploitation “is intended to identify a wrongness hidden behind the
façade of free contractual relations”).
77. See JOSÉ SERRA, THREE MISTAKEN THESES REGARDING THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN INDUSTRIALIZATION AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, in David Collier (ed.), THE NEW
AUTHORITARIANISM IN LATIN AMERICA 99, 102, n.8 (1979) (quoting RUI M. MARINI, DIALÉCTICA
DE LA DEPENDENCIA, 92–93 (1973)) (“‘[S]uperexploitation’ does not simply involve a high rate
of exploitation (i.e. a high rate of surplus value). It implies more. It means a ‘greater
exploitation of the physical strength of the worker, in contrast to the exploitation resulting
from the increase in his productivity. This normally is reflected in the fact that the labor force
is paid less that its actual value.’”); J. Craig Jenkins, The Demand for Immigrant Workers:
Labor Scarcity or Social Control?, 12 INT’L MIGRATION REVIEW 514, 528 (1978)
(“superexploitation” exists where “one body of workers performing essentially the same work
receives consistently lower wages than another,” or where “that body of workers is more
productive than another but receives the same wage rate”); Marlene Dixon, et al., Chicana and
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the term is also used in a broader sense to connote a situation of
particularly acute economic subordination:
Superexploitation refers to the condition whereby a group or
groups become dominant over a given population by forcefully
seizing that population’s valuable resources and creating the
conditions necessary for keeping that population in a long-term
state of subordination. The dominant population is often
supported in this effort by the state, and by a set of negative
ideologies used to stigmatize and delegitimize the victimized
population.78
Prison labor, in its various historical and contemporary forms,
exhibits the characteristic features of superexploitation. Inmates
typically work under unusually intense conditions for unusually low
wages.79 Their “extreme social exclusion,” established symbolically by
their criminal status and physically by their incarceration, reinforces
their extreme subordination.80 The prison wall serves as “a legal fiction .
. . manipulated by the state to define who shall have legal and civil rights
and who shall not, to define the conditions of exploitation to which
Mexicanas within a Transnational Working Class: Theoretical Perspectives, 7 Review (Fernand
Braudel Center) 109, 118 (1983) (quoting Jaime Osorio Urbina, Superexplotación y Clase
Obrera: El Casso Mexicano, 6 CUADERNOS POLITICOS 6–7 (1975)) (“The forms of
superexploitation that capitalist exploitation can assume are fundamentally three: increase in
the intensity of work, extension of the working day, payment of labor power below its value.”);
MARX, supra note 76, at 657 (“Forcible reduction of wages below [the] value [of labor-power]
… transforms, within certain limits, the laborer’s necessary consumption fund into a fund for
the accumulation of capital.”).
The Marxist concept of superexploitation is particularly associated with “dependency”
and “world systems” theories of economic development in the global “periphery” under
colonialism and imperialism. See John Smith, Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century, 67
MONTHLY REVIEW 033 (July-Aug. 2015), http://monthlyreview.org/2015/07/01/imperialism-inthe-twenty-first-century; John Smith, Outsourcing, Financialisation and the Crisis, 6 INT’L J.
OF MGMT. CONCEPTS AND PHIL. 19, 20 (2012) (discussing labor “outsourcing” as a strategy “to
cut costs and increase profits” through “much higher rates of exploitation available in southern
nations”); John Bellamy Foster, The Theory of Monopoly Capitalism: An Elaboration of
Marxian Political Economy, 161, 179–84 (New Ed. 2014) (discussing work of Paul Baran &
Paul Sweezy, Harry Magdoff, Andre Gunder Frank, and Samir Amin); Serra, supra note 77,
at 102 (discussing significance of superexploitation in analysis of “capitalist development in
Latin America”).
78. Aldon Morris, Building Blocks of Social Inequality: A Critique of Durable
Inequality, 42 COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOC’Y & HIST. 482,485 (2000).
79. PIE, which mandates payment of the “prevailing wage”, is a notable exception in
this regard. But in most respects, inmates working under PIE are subject to the same
substandard (relative to legally-mandated standards applicable to employment outside of
prison) working conditions as other incarcerated workers.
80. ANDY HIGGINBOTTOM, SUPER-EXPLOITATION OF IMMIGRANT LABOUR IN EUROPE:
THE CASE OF INTENSE AGRICULTURE IN SPAIN, Paper to the CSE conference Global Capital
and Global Struggles: Strategies, Alliances, Alternatives (London, 1–2 July, 2000). The fact
that the U.S. inmate population is disproportionately African-American further contributes to
this social isolation. Earl Smith & Angela J. Hattery, Incarceration: A Tool for Racial
Segregation and Labor Exploitation, 15 RACE, GENDER, & CLASS 79, 82 (2008) (62% of male
inmates and 50% of female inmates are African American, and 42% of all inmates are African
American men).
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workers are forced to submit.”81 Workers subject to superexploitation
inside the wall are seen as deserving their fate and unworthy of solidarity
from those on the outside.82
But the exploitive nature of prison labor does not turn solely, or even
principally, on the fact that it unfairly takes advantage of inmates’
unfreedom to compel their labor on unfavorable terms. Stone walls and
iron bars might a prison make,83 but they do not make prison labor
something separate and apart from labor in the outside world. Rather,
prison labor is embedded within a broader neo-liberal regime, under
which labor is subject to “a mode of domination of a new kind, based on
the creation of a generalized and permanent state of insecurity aimed at
forcing workers into submission, into the acceptance of exploitation.”84
The insecurity driving the domination of labor under neo-liberalism
arises from “the absolute reign of flexibility,”85 which manifests, among
other ways, in the rise of “insecure employment and the permanent threat
of unemployment.”86 This insecurity serves to discipline workers as it
“isolates[], atomizes, indivdualizes, demobilizes and strips away
solidarity.”87
Prison labor is part of this regime of anxiety-inducing flexibility. The
threat of job loss to the superexploited prison labor segment serves as a
disciplinary mechanism against demands by workers in the non-prison
labor market who see their own wages and working conditions eroded.88

81. Dixon et. al, supra note 77, at 148. Writing just as the U.S. prison population was
beginning its exponential growth, and only a few years after the enactment of the PIE
program, Dixon could have been referring to mass incarceration and the resurgence of inmate
contract labor when she observed that “the state is finding new, more insidious means of
stripping ever-greater sectors of the working class of legal and civil rights.” Id.; see also Kilgore,
supra note 6, at 363–64 (discussing mass incarceration as a “process of the criminalization of
the working class”).
82. See Higginbottom, supra note 80, (identifying social exclusion of superexploited
immigrant labor as an impediment to the mobilization of support from mainstream labor
organizations); Dixon et al., supra note 77, at 147 (describing “racism and sexism as weapons
to divide the working class, prevent it from developing unified opposition to capitalist policies,
and legitimate the superexploitation of minority workers and women.”).
83. Richard Lovelace, To Althea, from Prison (1642).
84. PIERRE BOURDIEU, ACTS OF RESISTANCE 85 (1998). Bourdieu named this new
mode “flexploitation.” Id.
85. Id. at 97.
86. Id. at 98.
87. Id.
88. John Bellamy et al., The Global Reserve Army of Labor and the New Imperialism,
63 MONTHLY REV. 6 (2011) ("If the new imperialism has its basis in the superexploitation of
workers in the global South, it is a phase of imperialism that in no way can be said to benefit
the workers of the global North, whose conditions are also being dragged down—both by the
disastrous global wage competition introduced by multinationals, and, more fundamentally,
by the overaccumulation tendencies in the capitalist core, enhancing stagnation, and
unemployment."); Fred Magdoff & Harry Magdoff, Disposable Workers Today's Reserve Army
of Labor, 55 MONTHLY REVIEW 11 ( 2004); but see Smith, note 6 at 39 (arguing that wage
stagnation resulting from global outsourcing has been offset by increased purchasing power
resulting from cheaper consumer goods, “attenuating class antagonisms within the imperialist
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III. INCARCERATED WORKERS AS STATUTORY EMPLOYEES
UNDER EXISTING LABOR LAW
Coverage of incarcerated workers under existing labor relations law
depends, as a threshold matter, on whether they fall within the statutory
definition of employees.89 Perhaps surprisingly, it does not appear that
the issue has been directly addressed under federal labor law.90
The most relevant cases under the NLRA have involved inmates
working for private employers under work-release programs.91 Those
cases have not directly addressed the question of whether such
incarcerated workers are statutory employees.92 Rather, the issue has
been whether incarcerated workers were properly included in a
bargaining unit together with non-inmate employees.93 The NLRB’s longstanding “test as to whether an employee shares a community of interest
with his fellows so as to be included in a unit with them depends on his
status while in the employment relationship and not what ultimate
control he may be subjected to at other times.”94 Applying this test, the
NLRB and the courts have repeatedly held that work-release inmates
were properly included in bargaining units together with other

nations while reinforcing the international disunity that paralyses working class agency at
both a national and global level”).
In a sense, the argument here is the flip side of Western & Beckett’s analysis of “the
penal system as a labor market institution” that “lowers conventional measure of
unemployment in the short run by concealing joblessness.” Bruce Western & Katherine
Beckett, How Unregulated is the U.S. Labor Market? The Penal System as a Labor Market
Institution, 104 AM. J. OF SOC.1030, 1031 (1999). Western & Beckett further argue that
incarceration “raises unemployment in the long run by damaging the job prospects of exconvicts after release.” Id. They do not address prison labor, and thus do not consider the effect
that the employment of inmates may have on unemployment among non-incarcerated
workers.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (defining “employee” to “include any employee”); 5
U.S.C. § 7103(a)(2) (2012) (defining “employee” as “an individual—employed in an agency”).
90. Administrative agencies and courts in at least two states have held that state
prison inmates working for the prison itself (either performing prison housework or in a staterun prison industry) were not employees under state public sector collective bargaining law.
In re Prisoners Labor Union at Marquette, Case No. R72, E163 (Mich. Empl. Rel. Comm., Mar.
22, 1974); Prisoners’ Labor Union at Green Haven, 6 P.E.R.B. ¶ 3033 (NY PERB 1973), aff’d,
Prisoners’ Labor Union at Bedford Hills (Women’s Div.) v. Helsby, 354 N.Y.S.2d 694 (NY App.
Div. 1974); see also Florida Stat. Ann. § 447.203(3)(f) (West 2016) (excluding state inmates
from definition of employee under public employee collective bargaining statute).
91.
Speedrack Products Group, Ltd. v. NLRB, 114 F.3d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Rosslyn Concrete Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 713 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1983); Georgia-Pacific Corp., 201
N.L.R.B. 760 (1973); Winsett-Simmonds Eng’rs, Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. 611 (1967); Nat’l Welders
Supply Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 948 (1964).
92. See Rosslyn Concrete, 713 F.2d at 63 (declining to address issue on petition for
review of NLRB decision where employer did not raise it before the NLRB).
93. Under the NLRA, a “bargaining unit” (i.e. the group of employees represented by
a union for collective bargaining) is “appropriate” only if the employees included in the unit
share a “community of interest” regarding their terms and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a), (b) (2012); Speedrack, 114 F.3d at 1278.
94. Speedrack, 114 F.3d at 1279 (citing, with approval, Winsett-Simminds Eng’rs,
Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. 611, 612 (1967)).
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employees.95 At a minimum, these cases establish that inmate status is
not incompatible with statutory employee status under the NLRA, and
that inmates working for private-sector employers may indeed have the
same statutory rights as other employees.
The issue of statutory employee status also confronts incarcerated
workers asserting rights or seeking protection under other employment
laws.96 Courts have generally been hostile to such claims,97 concluding
that the legal status of employee is somehow incompatible with the legal
status of prisoner.98 A common rationale in such decisions is the
ostensibly non-economic nature of inmate labor, i.e. the notion that the
work inmates perform is “essentially penological” rather than part of a
“bargained-for exchange of labor for consideration” that characterizes an
employment relationship.99
In some cases, however, courts have acknowledged the possibility
that incarcerated workers might be statutory employees notwithstanding
their incarceration.100 These courts have focused on “the recognizably
productive character of inmates’ work,” particularly where that work
entails the production of goods or performance of services for the “free”
market.101
The argument for recognizing inmates as statutory employees is
particularly strong when they are working for private, for-profit,
employers.102 Businesses that opt to employ inmate labor presumably do
95. Speedrack, 114 F.3d at 1276 (reversing Speedrack Products Group, Ltd., 320
N.L.R.B. 627 (1995)); Rosslyn Concrete, 713 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1983) (enforcing Rosslyn Concrete
Constr. Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 732 (1982)); Georgia-Pacific Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. 760 (1973); WinsettSimmonds Eng’rs, Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. 611 (1967). In National Welders Supply Co., 145 N.L.R.B.
948 (1964), the NLRB excluded work-release inmates from the bargaining unit on the grounds
that substantial differences in wages and other conditions of employment meant that inmateemployees did not share a community of interest with other employees.
96. See Zatz, supra note 1, at 867–79; Whitney Benns, “Free” Labor: The Law of
Prison Labor, ON LABOR (May 28, 2015), http://onlabor.org/2015/05/28/free-labor-the-law-ofprison-labor/.
97.
See Zatz, supra note 1, at 882–83, nn.101–03 (collecting and reviewing cases in
which courts have dismissed claims by inmates under various federal and state employment
laws).
98. Id.
99. Zatz, supra note 1, at 884–85 (quoting George v. SC Data Ctr., Inc. 884 F. Supp.
329 (W.D. Wis. 1995)).
100. See Zatz, supra note 1, at 892 n.155 (collecting cases). Indeed, in a leading case
rejecting incarcerated workers’ minimum wage and overtime claims on the grounds that they
were not statutory employees, the court nonetheless took pains to note, “[W]e do not believe
that prisoners are categorically excluded from the FLSA.” Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1389
(9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
101. Zatz, supra note 1, at 892–93.
102. Which is not to concede that there is a clear-cut distinction between work for
private industry and government agencies. Particularly where a prison industry fulfills the
ordinary material needs of government operations, it is “a proprietary enterprise”
indistinguishable from its private-sector counterparts, and should be treated as such under
the law. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 418–26 (1978)
(Berger, C.J., concurring); Charles M. Haar, Shopping Center Location Decisions: National
Competitive Policies and Local Zoning Regulations, in GEORGE STERNLIEB & JAMES W.
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so because it is economically advantageous. They should not be able to
evade labor law (nor other worker-protection laws) by the expedient of
moving their operations behind prison walls.
Permitting private employers to escape [the] costs [of employment
law compliance] while profiting from the use of prison labor
markets undermines the enforcement of the statutory
requirements generally, by creating incentives for competing
employers to shirk compliance with regard to non-prison labor—
and thereby economically disadvantaging competitors of those
employers using prison labor.103
The argument against recognizing prison labor as employment
frequently rests on the premise that the work that inmates perform
serves penological goals. Yet, while “[m]andatory labor may be
‘penological, not pecuniary,’ for prisoners and their jailers[, . . .] it is
assuredly a matter of dollars and cents to firms seeking profit in a
competitive market and law-abiding citizens vying to work for them.”104
In determining the status of workers under labor law, “the focus . . . is on
the interests of employees as employees, not their interests more
generally.”105
In the case of PIE, the authorizing statute itself sets out the
requirements for the program in terms that denote employment. Not only
does the statute require payment for inmates’ work, it expressly identifies
that payment as “wages,” a term specifically associated with an
employment relationship.106 Moreover, wage rates are expressly tied to
HUGHES, EDS, SHOPPING CENTERS: U.S.A. 106 (2012) (“When government acts as an
entrepreneur—again we are down to this marvelous, thin line of what decisionmaking belongs
to the private sector or to the public sector—then it is not excused from the antitrust cases on
the ground that it is mandated by the state.”). For a robust critique of the “public-private
distinction” as a legal organizing principle, see Chris Sagers, The Myth of “Privatization,” 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 56-71 (2007). While the NLRA excludes “any State or political subdivision
thereof” from the statutory definition of “employer”, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012), that exclusion
is neither constitutionally required nor appropriate in the case of those employed by stateowned proprietary enterprises. See Louisiana Power & Light, 435 U.S. at 409–13 (holding that
the Constitution does not require, and public policy does not support, exemption of
government-owned enterprises from coverage under federal antitrust law). I would argue that
Congress should amend the NLRA, limiting the “State or political subdivision” exclusion to
activities of state and local government in its sovereign capacity.
103. Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 912 (9th Cir. 2013) (Berzon, J.,
concurring).
104. Id.
105. Speedrack, 114 F.3d at 1280. The court in Speedrack cited this principle
specifically in relation to the “community of interests test” for bargaining unit determination.
But the principle also applies to the threshold question of employee status. So long as “a worker
goes about his or her ordinary tasks during the working day,” the worker’s other interests or
obligations do not negate statutory employee status. NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.,
516 U.S. 85, 95 (1995) (affirming NLRB’s determination that union “salts” are statutory
employees notwithstanding the fact that they are also paid by the union to organize the
employer’s employees); Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999) (holding medical interns,
residents, and fellows are statutory employees notwithstanding the fact that their work is also
part of an educational program required for professional license or specialist certification).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(2) (2012).
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those in the “free” labor market.107 The statute further mandates that
participating inmates’ “status as offenders” may not be a basis for
“depriv[ing them] of the right to participate in benefits made available by
the Federal or State Government to other individuals on the basis of their
employment.”108
If the “wages” and “benefits” provisions imply employee status, the
final statutory provision makes it explicit: Inmates must “participate[] in
such employment voluntarily.”109 The significance of this provision is twofold. First, the express characterization of inmates’ work as
“employment”—especially coupled with the requirements that inmates
receive “wages” and be eligible for employment-based “benefits”—
provides strong statutory support for the proposition that inmates
working under PIE are indeed employees in both a real and legal sense.110
Second, the requirement of voluntary participation distinguishes inmate
labor under PIE from situations where inmates are required to work as
part of their incarceration.111 The voluntary nature of inmate
participation in PIE, coupled with the payment of wages at rates
substantially higher than what inmates otherwise typically receive for
their work, casts inmate work under PIE as a “bargained-for exchange of
labor for consideration,” characteristic of an employment relationship.112
IV. CONCLUSION
The notion of unions for incarcerated workers may seem far-fetched.
Yet the idea has a long history. A century ago, the American Federation
of Labor embraced a plan for New York’s Sing Sing Penitentiary, under
which unions would assist with vocational training for inmates producing
goods under the state use system.113 Federation leaders saw the plan as
an opportunity to prepare inmates for free labor, and labor union
membership, upon their release.114
107. Id. (requiring payment of wages not less than locally prevailing rates).
108. Id. at § 1761(c)(3) (emphasis added). The term “benefits” in this subsection
appears to mean payments to employees under social insurance programs. See id. (identifying
“workmen’s compensation” as an example, and specifically excluding “unemployment
compensation”). It would be a stretch to assert that it includes the exercise of employee rights
under the NLRA and analogous public-employee labor relations laws. The significance of this
provision is its implicit recognition that incarcerated workers under PIE are analogous to other
employees.
109. Id. at § 1761(c)(4) (emphasis added).
110. Surely Congress was familiar with the common legal meaning and consequences
of the term “employment” and the long-standing issue of whether inmate labor should be
treated as such.
111. See Zatz, supra note 1, 884–88 (discussing courts’ emphasis on involuntary
nature of prison work as a rationale for denying employee status to inmates).
112. See id. at 885 (quoting Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992)).
113. A Worthy Prison Reform Experiment, AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST, vol. XXII, No.
11, Oct. 1915, at 850; Labor Men Approve Sing Sing Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1915, at 5.
114. A Worthy Prison Reform Experiment, supra note 113, at 850-51; Labor Men
Approve Sing Sing Reforms, supra note 113, at 5.
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In the early 1970s, inmates in prisons across the country formed
unions to assert grievances and advance and demand improvement in
both working conditions and conditions of incarceration more
generally.115 In some cases, these unions sought, but were denied, formal
legal recognition and rights under state public employee relations law.116
During the same period, the idea of inmate unions gained support
among prison reform advocates, who suggested that allowing prisoners to
organize and bargain with prison administrators could be a viable means
of addressing grievances and promoting rehabilitative goals.117 In 1977,
The American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft of Standards Relating to
the Legal Status of Prisoners118 specifically proposed that incarcerated
workers should “not be exempted from” labor and employment laws,
including “The National Labor Relations Act and other legal provisions
115. See Frank Browning, Organizing Behind Bars, RAMPARTS, Feb. 1972, at 40–45
(discussing California United Prisoners Union); C. Ronald Huff, Unionization Behind the
Walls, 12 CRIMINOLOGY 175, 178–85 (1974) (discussing the emergence and goals of prisoners’
unions in California, New York, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Michigan, Maine, Vermont,
Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Georgia, Washington, DC, Kansas, Minnesota, and
Washington); Sarah M. Singleton, Unionizing America’s Prisons—Arbitration and State-Use,
48 IND. L. J. 493, 501–02 (citing inmate union organizing in California, New York, Michigan,
Delaware, Ohio, and Pennsylvania). The prisoners’ union movement of the 1970s emerged out
of and was closely associated with the Black Power movement. See generally, Donald F. Tibbs,
From Black Power to Prison Power: The Making of Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor
Union (2012).
116. Prisoners’ Labor Union at Marquette v. Michigan, 61 Mich. App. 328 (Mich. App.
1975) (holding incarcerated workers not statutory employees under Michigan Public
Employees Relations Act); Matter of State of New York (Dept. of Correctional Services) and
Prisoners’ Labor Union at Green Haven, 6 PERB ¶ 3033 (NY PERB May 24, 1973) (holding
incarcerated workers not statutory employees under Taylor Law), aff’d sub nom. Prisoners’
Labor Union at Bedford Hills (Women’s Division) v. Helsby, 44 A.D.2d 707 (N.Y.A.D. 1974).
117. See, e.g., Bradley B. Falkof, Prisoner Representative Organizations, Prison
Reform, and Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union: An Argument for Increased Court
Intervention in Prison Administration, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 42 (1979) (“More and
more commentators are recognizing the benefits, both to the rehabilitative process and the
maintenance of internal prison security, offered by such prisoner grievance organizations as
prisoner unions and inmate advisory councils.”); Comment, The Future of Prisoners’ Unions:
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 799, 80–09 (1978)
(discussing role of prisoners’ unions as means of channeling inmate grievances, “publicizing
prison conditions”, and “facilitat[ing] rehabilitation); Sidney Zonn, Inmate Unions: An
Appraisal of Prisoner Rights and Labor Implications, 32 MIAMI L. REV. 613 (1978); Note, The
First Amendment Behind Bars: Prisoners’ Right to Form a “Union”, 8 PAC. L. J. 121 (1977);
Ronald C. Huff, Unionization Behind the Walls, 12 CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1974); Sarah M.
Singleton, Unionizing America’s Prisons--Arbitration and State-Use, 48 IND. L. J. 493 (1973);
Warren E. Burger, Our Options Are Limited, 18 VILLANOVA L. REV. 165, 170, 171 (1972) (citing
ABA Commission on Correctional Facilities & Services proposal for “the creation of grievance
procedures for prisoner complaints”); Comment, Labor Unions for Prison Inmates: An Analysis
of A Recent Proposal for the Organization of Inmate Labor, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 963 (1971–72);
Note, Bargaining in Correctional Institutions: Restructuring the Relation between the Inmate
and the Prison Authority, 81 YALE L. J. 726, 745–46, 748–49 (1971–72) (discussing “democratic
union model” of “formal bargaining” between prison administration and inmates); Stanley
Bass, Correcting the Correctional System: A Responsibility of the Legal Profession, 5
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 125, 149 (1971) (“Since prisoners have the right to petition for redress
of grievances, it would seem that they are also entitled to associate with each other and with
others, within allowable prison limitations, for the purpose of bettering their condition.”).
118. 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377 (1977).
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regulating labor-management relations in private employment”.119 Joint
Committee of the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Section
issued a The American Bar Association’s Reformers frequently cited the
experience of prisoners’ unions in European countries as evidence that
such organizations could have salutary effects.120
Nevertheless, prison authorities generally objected to, and refused
to permit, inmate unionization, contending that prisoner organizing and
collective bargaining posed a threat to institutional security and other
penological objectives.121 That argument prevailed, and the
prisoners’ union movement suffered a legal setback, in Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc.122
In 1974, Wayne Brooks, an inmate at North Carolina’s Central
Prison, formally established the North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union
(“NCPLU”) as a by filing articles of incorporation.123 The stated purposes
of NCPLU included “seek[ing] through collective bargaining . . . to
improve . . . working . . . conditions.”124 Consistent with that purpose,
NCPLU affiliated with the North Carolina AFL-CIO.125 State prison
officials at least tacitly permitted individual membership in the union.126
But, in an effort to prevent union organizing and activity, prison
authorities adopted regulations “to prohibit inmate solicitation of other
inmates, meetings between members of the Union, and bulk mailings
concerning the Union from outside sources.”127 NCPLU sued, contending
that the regulations infringed on the constitutional rights of the union
and its members to free speech, association, and assembly.128 Relying on
119. Id. at 393–94 (Standard 4.3 Conditions of Employment). As ultimately approved
by the ABA House of Delegates, the standard on Conditions of Employment declares to the
contrary: “These standards are not intended to extend to prisoners the right to strike or take
other concerted action to affect the wages, hours, benefits, terms, or other conditions of their
employment within correctional institutions.” ABA, Legal Status of Prisoners, Standard 234.2
Conditions
of
Employment.
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standard
s_prisoners_status.html#23-4.2.
120. See, e.g., Comment, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 820–23 (discussing Swedish
inmate unions); Comment, 21 BUFF L. REV. at 964; 8 PAC. L. J. at 121 n. 4.; Note, 81 YALE L.
J. at 749 (citing Swedish inmate councils as example of “democratic union model” for inmate
representation and bargaining); Bass, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. at 149 (“Prison unions exist in
some European countries, and there is no reason why such a valuable rehabilitative tool could
not also be utilized productively in the United States.”); Huff, supra note 117, at 185–86
(discussing inmate unions in Sweden and Denmark).
121. See Huff, supra note 117, at 186–88, n.13 (discussing reaction of prison
administrators to inmate unionization); Comment, 21 BUFF. L. REV. at 966–68 (quoting
spokesperson for New York Department of Correctional Services and citing results of survey
of state corrections departments).
122. 433 U.S. 119 (1977)
123. Tibbs, supra note 115, at 137.
124. Jones, 433 U.S. at 122.
125. Tibbs, supra note 115, at 140.
126. Jones, 433 U.S. at 122.
127. Id.
128. Id. The union also asserted, and the Court similarly rejected, an equal protection
challenge to the regulations. Id. at 133–36.
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prison administrators’ assertions that union activity would promote
conflict, threaten institutional security, and undermine penological
objectives, a majority of the Court held that “the regulations are drafted
no more broadly than they need be to meet the perceived threat which
stems directly from group meetings and group organizational activities of
the Union.”129
The majority opinion in Jones has been subject to ample criticism,
particularly for deferring too much to prison administrators’ bare
assertions of security concerns, without requiring any evidentiary
support of actual threats.130 Yet, as concerns the argument here for
extending union organizing and bargaining rights to incarcerated
workers under PIECP, UNICOR, and similar programs, the significance
of Jones lies more in what the Court did not decide. The majority did not
hold that NCPLU’s members were not statutory employees. Indeed, that
question did not arise in Jones at all. As the Court noted,131 North
Carolina law expressly forbids collective bargaining agreements for all
state employees.132 Consequently, on the basic question of whether
incarcerated workers may be regarded as statutory employees under
statutes like the NLRA,133 Jones has nothing to say.
Despite the setback that Jones represented, inmates have continued
to organize unions. Notable examples include the formation of a prisoners’
union at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (Lucasville) in 1987,134
and more recently the Free Alabama Movement and similar organizing
efforts in other states.135 Like the prisoners’ unions of the 1970s, the new
129. Id. at 133.
130. In dissent, Justices Marshall and Brennan extensively criticized the majority on
this ground, and warned, “If the mode of analysis adopted in today’s decision were to be
generally followed, prisoners eventually would be stripped of all constitutional rights, and
would retain only those privileges that prison officials, in their ‘informed discretion,’ deigned
to recognize.” Jones, 433 U.S. at 146 (Marshall, J. dissenting); see also, Falkof, supra note 117,
at 43 (“By relegating a prison reform such as inmate unions to the absolute control of securityminded prison officials, the Court has sacrificed a prisoner’s fundamental rights of free speech
and association to the mere allegation of a custodial concern for order and discipline.”);
Comment, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 814-15 (1978) (“The Court showed itself to be too
ready to accept the conclusions of others that a prisoners’ union is inherently disruptive.”).
131. Jones, 433 U.S. at 122, n.1.
132. N.C. Gen. State. Sec. 95-98 (1975).
133. See Part III, supra.
134. Ohio
Prisoners
Want
Union,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
4,
1987,
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/05/us/ohio-prisoners-want-union.html.
135. See George Lavender, Is Prison Labor a Union Issues?, IN THESE TIMES (Apr. 28,
2014),
http://inthesetimes.com/prisoncomplex/entry/16618/why_the_wobblies_support_alabama_prisoners_work_strike;
Devon
Douglas-Bowers, Challenging Prisons: An Interview With the Free Alabama Movement,
TRUTHOUT (Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33974-challenging-theprisons-an-interview-with-the-free-alabama-movement. Like the Lucasville union, these
recent efforts have been supported by the Industrial Workers of the World (“IWW”), which has
formed an Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee for this purpose. See George
Lavender, Alabama Prison Work Strike ‘Stalls’ But Wins Support from Wobblies, IN THESE
TIMES
(Apr.
25,
2014),
http://inthesetimes.com/prisoncomplex/entry/16607/alabama_prisoners; About Us, IWW INCARCERATED WORKERS
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, https://iwoc.noblogs.org/about/ (last visited June 24, 2016).
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wave of inmate organizing does not limit its focus to labor matters, but
seeks changes in prison conditions more generally.136
The lesson of this history is that, with or without legal support,
incarcerated workers, like workers on the outside, have persisted in
organizing and acting through unions as a means of improving the
conditions under which they labor and live.
The wholesale denial of union organizing and collective bargaining
rights is justified neither by hair-splitting efforts to define incarcerated
workers as non-employees, nor by bald assertions that recognizing such
rights would imperil prison order and security. Rather, a rational
approach would recognize prison labor for what it is: part-and-parcel of
the contemporary economy. An experiment involving the relatively small
number of incarcerated workers under PIECP and UNICOR will provide
an opportunity to fine-tune existing labor relations law to deal with the
special issues associated with the peculiar setting on prison labor.

136. See Melvin Ray, Free Alabama Movement, at 23–64 (undated),
http://freealabamamovement.com/FREE%20ALABAMA%20MOVEMENT.pdf
(discussing
grievances and demands); Alabama Prison Strike Organizer Speaks from Behind Bars: We Are
Engaged in a Struggle for Our Lives, DEMOCRACY NOW (May 13, 2016),
http://www.democracynow.org/2016/5/13/alabama_prison_strike_organizer_speaks_from
(discussing proposed legislation to address prison overcrowding); Devon Douglas-Bowers,
Challenging Prisons: An Interview With the Free Alabama Movement, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 12,
2015), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33974-challenging-the-prisons-an-interview-withthe-free-alabama-movement (discussing demands).

